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Abstract The ancient problems of bankruptcy, contested garment, and rights arbi-
tration have generated many studies, debates, and controversy. The objective of this
paper is to show that the Shapley value from game theory, measuring the power of
each player in a game, may be consistently applied for getting the general one-step
solution of all these three problems viewed as n-person games. The decision mak-
ing is based on the same tool, namely the game theory logic based on the use of the
Shapley value, but the specific games involved are slightly different in each problem.
The kind of claims of the players, the relationship between the given claims and the
given resources available, and the particular way of calculating the generalized char-
acteristic function of the game determine the specific type of game which has to be
solved in each of the three ancient problems mentioned. The iterative use of the Shap-
ley value may also justify the well-known Aumann–Maschler step-by-step procedure
for solving the bankruptcy problem.
Keywords Bankruptcy problem · Contested garment problem · Rights arbitration
problem · Shapley value · Cumulative and maximal generalized characteristic
functions
1 Introduction
Three ancient problems, whose intriguing solutions were given without any justifica-
tion back then, generated many studies with very different interpretations, debates,
and controversy. Heuristic procedures and new concepts have been introduced, just to
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justify the numerical solutions given very long ago, but a uniform method for solving
these three ancient problems was still missing.
1.1 The bankruptcy problem
As mentioned by Gura (2009), in the ancient bankruptcy problem, known also as
the Talmudic problem of three wives, a man married three women and promised
them in their marriage contract the sum of d1 = 100, d2 = 200, and d3 = 300 units of
money to be given to them upon his death. The man died but his estate E amounted
to less then 600 units. The Mishna, attributed to Rabbi Nathan, treats the cases in
which the estate E was worth 100, 200, and 300 units of money. The division of
the estate among the three wives, corresponding to these three cases, is shown in
Table 1.
In the modern law, a division of the estate proportionally with the correspond-
ing debts is the common practice. Table 1 shows both a uniform distribution of the
estate (for E = 100), and a proportional distribution (for E = 300), whereas the dis-
tribution corresponding to E = 200 has raised question marks and objections about
how it was obtained and how it could be rationalized and justified. As noted by
Aumann and Maschler (1985): “The figures for E = 200 look mysterious; but what-
ever they may mean, they do not fit any obvious extension of either equal or pro-
portional division. A common rationale for all three cases is not apparent. Over
two millennia, [the data set from Table 1] has spawned a large literature. Many
authorities disagree with it outright. Others attribute the figures to special
circumstances not made explicit [in the Talmud]. A few have attempted direct ratio-
nalization of the figures as such, mostly with little success. One modern scholar, exas-
perated by his inability to make sense of the text, suggested errors in transcription.
In brief, the passage [i.e. Table 1] is notoriously difficult.” In the end, Aumann and
Maschler (1985) proposed the following heuristic procedure for justifying the solu-
tions for the bankruptcy problem from Table 1: Assuming that there are n creditors
and that the estate satisfies the inequality E ≤ (d1 + · · · + dn)/2, for instance, “when
[the estate] E is small, all n claimants divide it equally. This continues until 1 has
received d1/2; for the time being [claimant 1] stops receiving payments, and each
additional dollar is divided equally between the remaining n − 1 claimants. This, in
turn, continues until claimant 2 has received d2/2, at which point [claimant 2] stops
receiving payments for the time being, and each additional dollar is divided equally
between the remaining n −2 claimants. The process continues until each claimant has
received half his claim. This happens when E = (d1 + · · · + dn)/2.” This procedure
Table 1 Bankruptcy problem in
the Babylonian Talmud Estate Debt
100 200 300





200 50 75 75
300 50 100 150
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Table 2 Contested garment





Table 3 Rights arbitration
problem Estate Claim
30 40 60 120







works for explaining heuristically how the solutions from Table 1 (for E = 200 and
E = 300) and Table 2 may be obtained. The entire procedure seems to favour the cred-
itors with smaller claims. But no justification was given why a small estate E = 100
has to be divided equally among claimants, and why the claimants whose claims are
smaller than the available resources are successively awarded half of their respective
claims. Also, if this procedure is applied to the rights arbitration problem, the results
are completely different from those given in Table 3.
1.2 The contested garment problem
This is another ancient problem from the Babylonian Talmud which, according to
O’Neill (1982), was formulated in a very simple way: “Two hold a garment. If one
of them says, ‘It is all mine’, and the other says, ‘Half of it is mine’, then the former
receives three quarters and the latter receives one quarter.” How can such a solution,
shown in Table 2, be justified?
1.3 The rights arbitration problem
According to O’Neill (1982), around 1140 A.D., Abraham Ibn Ezra formulated the
following inheritance problem: “Jacob died and his son Reuben produced a deed
duly witnessed that Jacob willed to him the entire estate on his death, son Simeon
also produced a deed that his father willed to him half of the estate, Levi produced
a deed giving him one third and Judah brought forth a deed giving one quarter. All
of them bear the same date.” The wills seem equally valid but are mutually incon-
sistent because they give away more than the total estate. Assuming that the estate
is E = 120, in whatever units, Ibn Ezra mentioned that one solution would be to
divide the estate in proportion to each son’s claim but rejected such a proportional
solution in favour of another one, according to which the four sons Judah, Levi,




6 , and 80
5
6 , respectively, as shown in
Table 3.
The general decision process of arbitration is very complex and the decision maker,
called here the judge, can be very subjective in his final ruling. The many ways of
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solving the bankruptcy and rights arbitration problems are amply presented in the
extensive survey paper Thomson (2003). Here, on the other hand, we focus only on
the three ancient problems just mentioned and the objective is to show that the Shap-
ley value (Shapley 1953) from the n-person game theory, measuring the power of
the different players involved in a game, can be used for justifying, in a uniform and
unambiguous way, the ancient solutions given to all these three problems. In the next
section, the Shapley value method is used for getting the general solution, in one step,
of these three ancient problems viewed as n-person games.
It is not without interest to note that the concept of Shapley value was mentioned
both in the context of the bankruptcy problem in Aumann and Maschler (1985), Moulin
(1992), Moulin (2003), Thomson (2003), Alcade et al. (2005), De Mesnard (2008), and
in the analysis of the rights arbitration problem (O’Neill 1982). In particular, (Moulin
2003, p. 57) pointed clearly that the Shapley value applied to a two-claimant game
gives the same solution as that of the contested garment problem. On the other hand,
Aumann and Maschler (1985) showed that the games corresponding to the bankruptcy
problem for E = 200 and E = 300 may be solved by applying the solution of the con-
tested garment problem to each pair of contestants. However, the game corresponding
to the bankruptcy problem for the case E = 100 and the game corresponding to the
rights arbitration problem cannot be solved by using the solution of the contested
garment problem. O’Neill (1982) also discussed several decision methods and pro-
posed the method of recursive completion which is in fact the Shapley value of the
cooperative game corresponding to the bankruptcy problem. Recently, De Mesnard
(2008) showed that the Shapley value method applied to the bankruptcy problem,
viewed as a regular three-person game, gives a solution for E = 200 different from the
Talmudic solution, implying the conclusion that the use of the Shapley value cannot
fully justify all the ancient solutions shown in Tables 1–3. The present paper arrives
to a different conclusion.
The objective of this paper is to show that the Shapley value from game theory, mea-
suring the power of each player in a game, may be consistently applied for getting the
general one-step solution of all these three problems, namely the bankruptcy problem,
the contested garment problem, and the rights arbitration problem, viewed as n-person
games. The decision making is based on the same tool, namely the game theory logic
based on the iterative use of the Shapley value, but the specific games involved are
slightly different in each problem. The kind of claims of the players, the relationship
between the given claims and the given resources available, and the particular way of
calculating the generalized characteristic function of the game determine the specific
type of game which has to be solved in each of the three ancient problems mentioned.
Ignoring the specific kind of game induced by the relationship between the values of
the claims and the value of the estate involved in each problem could give misleading
results like De Mesnard (2008) counterexample which seemed to compromise the
possibility of solving the bankruptcy problem as a three-person game by using the
Shapley value in the case E = 200.
The Shapley value may be calculated only if we know the generalized characteristic
function of the respective game. The delicate point is that the given claims and the
estate do not determine completely the values of the generalized characteristic func-
tion for the proper possible coalitions of the game. This opens the door to different
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ways for filling this gap and, therefore, to different possible solutions of the game.
This paper shows that the division of the estate from Tables 1–3 may be obtained by
using only the Shapley value, as a mathematical tool, if the bankruptcy problem is
viewed as being a cumulative game and the rights arbitration problem is viewed as
being a maximal game. A cumulative game is the classic case of an n-person game in
which the values of the characteristic function for the proper coalitions are calculated
additively, reflecting the fact that the members are not willing to reach a compromise
and share their claims. A maximal game is the classic case of an n-person game in
which the values of the characteristic function for the proper coalitions are calculated
by taking the maximum claim into account, reflecting the fact that the members are
willing to reach a compromise and share their claims.
Section 2 contains the general one-step solutions of the three ancient problems
viewed as n-person games, using the Shapley value method. Section 3 shows that the
well-known Aumann and Maschler (1985) solutions for the bankruptcy and contested
garment problems may be obtained and justified by an iterative application of the
Shapley value method when, at each step, the creditor with the lowest claim competes
against all the other remaining creditors.
2 General, one-Step solutions of the ancient problems viewed as n-person
games
2.1 Shapley value
Let N = {1, . . . , n} be the set of players. Every subset S ⊆ N is a possible coalition.
There are 2n possible subsets S of N , including the empty set ∅. To give an n-person
game means to give the set N of players and, for each subset S ⊆ N , a real number
ν(S) representing the value of the coalition S, such that:
ν(∅) = 0, ν(S) ≥ 0, ν(S1) ≤ ν(S2) if S1 ⊂ S2. (1)
In an n-person game with the generalized characteristic function ν, the amount
ν(S ∪{i})−ν(S) measures the contribution of player {i} to the increase in the value of
coalition S if this player joins in. The Shapley value is the average of players’ marginal




[ν(S ∪ {i}) − ν(S)] pn(S), (2)
where:
pn(S) = | S |! (n− | S | −1)!
n! , (3)
and | S | is the number of players from the coalition S ⊆ N . The Shapley value shows
the power of the respective player (Shapley 1953; Winston 1994).
[183] 123
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The nonnegative monotonic set function ν is called the generalized characteristic
function of the game. The monotonicity property simply states that if a coalition S2
contains more players than coalition S1, then S2 cannot have a smaller value than
S1. The set function ν, satisfying (1), is called the generalized characteristic function
because, normally, it is required to be a supperadditive set function, which means that
the value of a union of disjoint coalitions, ν(S1 ∪ S2) is supposed to be larger than or
equal to ν(S1)+ν(S2). If a nonnegative set function is superadditive then, obviously, it
is monotonic. The converse is not necessarily true. One of the qualities of the Shapley
value over other solutions of an n-person game is that it uses only the monotonicity
of ν and not superadditivity.
2.2 The games induced by the claims of the players and the estate
Let us assume that we have a set of players, N = {1, . . . , n}. Their claims are d1 <
· · · < dn , and the total resource available is the estate E < (d1 + · · · + dn)/2. The
assumption that the claims are different, as it is the case in the three ancient problems,
is not essential but simplifies the analysis.
If the values ν({1}), . . . , ν({n}) of the generalized characteristic function ν assigned
to each player are given, then the corresponding n-person game is cumulative if the
value of the generalized characteristic function ν for each subset of players {i1, . . . , ik}
is calculated according to:
ν ({i1, . . . , ik}) = min {ν({i1}) + · · · + ν({ik}), E} ,
for all k = 2, . . . , n. In such a game the claim of each coalition is the sum of the
claims of its members if it does not exceed the estate E . It corresponds to the case
when the players stick to their own claims and are not willing to compromise and
share the claims.
If the values ν({1}), . . . , ν({n}) of the generalized characteristic function ν assigned
to each player are given, then the corresponding n-person game is maximal if the value
of the generalized characteristic function ν for each subset of players {i1, . . . , ik} is
calculated according to:
ν({i1, . . . , ik}) = min{max{ν({i1}), . . . , ν({ik})}, E},
for all k = 2, . . . , n. In such a game the claim of each coalition is the maximum of
the claims of its members if it does not exceed the estate E . It corresponds to the case
when the players are willing to compromise and share the maximum claim.
In our context, in a cumulative game the claim of a coalition is the sum of the
claims of its members or the entire estate if this sum exceeds the estate. In such a
game, the members of a coalition make no compromise; each sticks to his own claim
and is not willing to share parts of it with other members of the respective coalition.
The members of a coalition expect the judge to give them their respective claim. In a
maximal game, the claim of a coalition is the maximum claim of its members and they
are supposed to share this maximum among them. In such a game, the judge expects
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the members of a coalition to cooperate and reach a compromise, sharing the amount
awarded to the respective coalition.
The division of the estate in the three wives problem, as given in Table 1, may be
justified if the judge looks at the corresponding game as being a cumulative game with
the wives unwilling to compromise and share parts of their claims.
The division of the estate in the rights arbitration problem, as given in Table 3, may
be justified if the judge looks at the corresponding game as being a maximal game,
assuming that the four brothers are willing to reach a compromise and share parts of
their claims when they form a coalition.
On the other hand, the contested garment problem is very simple. The two claims
d1, d2 and the estate E completely determine the corresponding game because there
are no proper coalitions in the total set N = {1, 2}.
Remark Let us take an arbitrary cumulative or maximal game in which the generalized
characteristic function ν assigns to each player his claim, if it does not exceed the estate,
namely ν({i}) = min{di , E}, (i = 1, . . . , n). If E ≤ d1 < · · · < dn , which means
that no claim is smaller than the estate, then, according to their Shapley values, the
players get the same reward ωi = E/n, (i = 1, . . . , n), sharing the estate E .
This result, which is true both for cumulative and maximal games, is often accepted
as being obvious; nevertheless, it may be justified using the Shapley value and plays
an important role in what follows. Indeed, if the game is cumulative,
ν({i}) = min{di , E} = E, (i = 1, . . . , n);
ν({i1, . . . , ik}) = min{ν({i1}) + · · · + ν({ik}), E} = E, (k = 2, . . . , n).
If the game is maximal,
ν({i}) = min{di , E} = E, (i = 1, . . . , n);
ν({i1, . . . , ik}) = min{max{ν({i1}), . . . , ν({ik})}, E} = E, (k = 2, . . . , n).
The Shapley value of player i is:
ωi = (E − 0)pn(∅) + (E − E)
∑
S⊂N ,i /∈S,S 	=∅
pn(S) = E 0!(n − 0 − 1)!/n! = E/n.
The result just discussed shows that if a player wants to get the entire estate when
his claim exceeds the estate, cannot do this because if no claim is smaller than the
current estate available, it has to be shared equally among the players. Based on this
essential fact, we define the generalized characteristic function of the game such that
the value which is assigned to a player reflects the maximum claim he can ask for,
subject to the restrictions induced by the relationship between all the claims and the
portion of the estate available. Taking into account the result just proved, when we
define the generalized characteristic function of the game, we have to make a distinc-
tion between the players whose claims are smaller than the estate and those whose
claims are not smaller than the estate.
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Based on this essential remark, we set the following axiom: In the general case, if
d1 < · · · < dm−1 < E ≤ dm < · · · < dn , we define:
ν(∅) = 0, ν({i}) = di , (i = 1, . . . , m − 1), (4)
ν({i}) = dm−1 + (E − dm−1)/(n − m + 1), (i = m, . . . , n). (5)
According to (4), the generalized characteristic function ν assigns the value di to
the player i , if his claim is smaller than the estate, whereas, according to (5), the other
n − m + 1 players whose claims exceed the estate E , cannot claim more than dm−1
plus the excess of the resource E − dm−1 equally divided among them, as shown at
the beginning of this Subsection.
2.3 Solution of the bankruptcy problem
There are three players, N = {1, 2, 3}, and we have three possible cases which gen-
eralize the Talmudic variants of the bankruptcy problem.
Case 1 If E ≤ d1 < d2 < d3, we have n = 3 and m = 1. According to the remark
discussed at the beginning of Sect. 2.2, the Shapley value implies that the solution is:
ω1 = E/3, ω2 = E/3, ω3 = E/3. (6)
In the Talmudic problem, E = 100, d1 = 100, d2 = 200, d3 = 300 and the solution
(6) becomes: ω1 = ω2 = ω3 = 100/3 = 33(1/3).
Case 2 If d1 < E ≤ d2 < d3, we have n = 3 and m = 2. According to (4) and (5),
the generalized characteristic function of the corresponding three-person cumulative
game has the values:
ν(∅) = 0, ν({1}) = d1, ν({2}) = d1 + (E − d1)/2, ν({3}) = d1 + (E − d1)/2,
ν({1, 2}) = min{d1 + d2, E} = E, ν({1, 3}) = min{d1 + d3, E} = E,
ν({2, 3}) = min{d2 + d3, E} = E, ν({1, 2, 3}) = min{d1 + d2 + d3, E} = E .
For this three-person game, the Shapley values of the players are:
ω1 = (d1 − 0)(2/6) + [(E − d1)/2](1/6) + [(E − d1)/2](1/6) + (E − E)(2/6)
= (E + d1)/6.
ω2 = ω3 = {[d1 + (E − d1)/2] − 0}(2/6) + (E − d1)(1/6)
+[E − d1 − (E − d1)/2](1/6) + (E − E)(2/6) = (5E − d1)/12,
Obviously, ω1 + ω2 + ω3 = E .
Therefore, the solution is:
ω1 = (E + d1)/6, ω2 = (5E − d1)/12, ω3 = (5E − d1)/12. (7)
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In the Talmudic problem, E = 200, d1 = 100, d2 = 200, d3 = 300 and the solution
(7) becomes: ω1 = 50, ω2 = 75, ω3 = 75.
Case 3 If d1 < d2 < E ≤ d3 <, we have n = 3 and m = 3. According to (4) and (5),
the generalized characteristic function of the corresponding three-person cumulative
game has the values:
ν(∅) = 0, ν({1}) = d1, ν({2}) = d2, ν({3}) = d2 + (E − d2)/1 = E,
ν({1, 2}) = min{d1 + d2, E} =
{
d1 + d2, if d1 + d2 < E,
E, if d1 + d2 ≥ E,
ν({1, 3}) = min{d1 + d3, E} = E,
ν({2, 3}) = min{d2 + d3, E} = E, ν({1, 2, 3}) = min{d1 + d2 + d3, E} = E .
(a) Let us assume that d1 + d2 < E . Then, in this three-person game, the Shapley
values of the players are:
ω1=(d1 − 0)(2/6)+ [(d1 + d2)− d2](1/6)+ (E − E)(1/6)+ (E − E)(2/6)= d1/2,
ω2 = (d2 − 0)(2/6)+ [(d1 + d2)− d1](1/6)+ (E − E)(1/6)+ (E−E)(2/6)= d2/2,
ω3 = (E − 0)(2/6) + (E − d1)(1/6)+ (E − d2)(1/6)
+[E − (d1 + d2)](2/6)= E −[(d1/2)+ (d2/2)].
Therefore, if d1 + d2 < E , the solution is:
ω1 = d1/2, ω2 = d2/2, ω3 = E − [(d1/2) + (d2/2)]. (8)
(b) Let us assume that d1 + d2 ≥ E . Then, in this three-person game, the Shapley
values of the players are:
ω1 = (d1 − 0)(2/6) + (E − d2)(1/6) + (E − E)(1/6) + (E − E)(2/6)
= (E + 2d1 − d2)/6,
ω2 = (d2 − 0)(2/6) + (E − d1)(1/6) + (E − E)(1/6) + (E − E)(2/6)
= (E − 2d2 − d1)/6,
ω3 = (E − 0)(2/6) + (E − d1)(1/6) + (E − d2)(1/6) + (E − E)(2/6)
= (4E − d1 − d2)/6.
Therefore, if d1 + d2 ≥ E , the solution is:
ω1 = (E + 2d1 − d2)/6, ω2 = (E − 2d2 − d1)/6, ω3 = (4E − d1 − d2)/6.
(9)
In the Talmudic problem, E = 300, d1 = 100, d2 = 200, d3 = 300 and the
solution (9) becomes: ω1 = 50, ω2 = 100, ω3 = 150.
[187] 123
74 Synthese (2011) 181:65–79
Remarks 1. Each of the solutions (6)–(9) is monotonic because, in each of them,
the Shapley values ω1, ω2, and ω3, when they depend on the estate E , are linear
functions of E , with the coefficients of E positive. Therefore, no player (claimant)
loses from an increase in the estate E .
2. Each of the solutions (6)–(9) is order-preserving because, in each of them, the
Shapley values ω1, ω2, and ω3, satisfy:
ω1 ≤ ω2 ≤ ω3, 0 ≤ d1 − ω1 ≤ d2 − ω2 ≤ d3 − ω3,
showing that a player with a higher claim than another gets an award that is no
smaller and suffers a loss that is no smaller; both the awards and the loose preserve
the order of the claims.
3. De Mesnard (2008) used the Shapley value for solving the bankruptcy problem
as a three-person game assuming, as an axiom, that the values of the generalized
characteristic function ν are ν({i}) = min{di , E}, for all players, making no dif-
ference between the players whose claims are smaller than the estate and those
whose claims are not smaller than the estate. For the case E = 200, the solution
obtained by him (ω1 = 33 13 , ω2 = 83 13 , ω3 = 83 13 ) is not the Talmudic solu-
tion (ω1 = 50, ω2 = 75, ω3 = 75), casting a serious doubt over any attempt
of getting all the Talmudic solutions using the Shapley value of the correspond-
ing three-person game. Nothing is wrong with De Mesnard’s computations and
he correctly looked at the corresponding three-person game as being a cumula-
tive game, without explicitly stating this, but he followed Aumann and Maschler
(1985) and assumed that the ‘truncation’ (Moulin 2003, pp. 37–38, 262) is done
before sharing, which means that he used a different axiom than that used in this
paper.
4. Let us note that (E + d1)/6 = d1/2 if and only if E + d1 = 3d1 or E = 2d1. This
happens in the Talmudic case when E = 200 and d1 = 100.
2.4 Solution of the contested garment problem
There are two players N = {1, 2} and d1 < E = d2, which means that n = 2 and
m = 2. According to (4) and (5), the values of the generalized characteristic function
assigned to the two players are:
ν(∅) = 0, ν({1}) = d1, ν({2}) = d1 + (E − d1)/1 = E,
and, if the two-person game is viewed as being either cumulative or maximal, we have:
ν({1, 2}) = min{d1 + E, E} = min{max{d1, E}, E} = E .
The Shapley values of the two players are:
ω1 = (d1 − 0)(1/2) + (E − E)(1/2) = d1/2,
ω2 = (E − 0)(1/2) + (E − d1)(1/2) = E − (d1/2).
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Therefore, the solution of the general contested garment problem is:
ω1 = d1/2, ω2 = E − (d1/2). (10)
In the Talmudic version, E = 1, d1 = 1/2, and d2 = E = 1. Introducing these
values in (10), we get: ω1 = 1/4 and ω2 = 1 − (1/4) = 3/4.
Remark The solution (10) is obviously monotonic and order-preserving.
2.5 Solution of the rights arbitration problem
Let us assume that we have a maximal four-player game where the players are N =
{1, 2, 3, 4}, and the claims are such that d1 < d2 < d3 < E = d4. Therefore, n = 4
and m = 4. According to (4) and (5), the values of the generalized characteristic
function of the game assigned to the players are:
ν({∅}) = 0, ν({1}) = d1, ν({2}) = d2, ν({3}) = d3,
ν({4}) = d3 + (E − d3)/1 = E = d4
The game being maximal, the values of the generalized characteristic function for the
proper subsets of players are:
ν({1, 2}) = min{max{d1, d2}, E} = d2,
ν({1, 3}) = min{max{d1, d3}, E} = d3,
ν({1, 4}) = min{max{d1, d4}, E} = d4 = E,
ν({2, 3}) = min{max{d2, d3}, E} = d3,
ν({2, 4}) = min{max{d2, d4}, E} = d4 = E,
ν({3, 4}) = min{max{d3, d4}, E} = d4 = E,
ν({1, 2, 3}) = min{max{d1, d2, d3}, E} = d3,
ν({1, 2, 4}) = min{max{d1, d2, d4}, E} = d4 = E,
ν({1, 3, 4}) = min{max{d1, d3, d4}, E} = d4 = E,
ν({2, 3, 4}) = min{max{d2, d3, d4}, E} = d4 = E,
Taking into account that:
p4(∅) = 0!(4 − 0 − 1)!/4! = 1/4,
p4({i}) = p4({i, j}) = (1!)(2!)/4! = 1/12 if i = j,
p4({i, j, k}) = 3!(4 − 3 − 1)!/4! = 1/4 if i 	= j 	= k,
the Shapley values of the players are:
ω1 = d1/4, ω2 = (4d2 − d1)/12, ω3 = (6d3 − d1 − 2d2)/12, (11)
ω4 = (12d4 − d1 − 2d2 − 6d3)/12 (12)
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Going back to the ancient rights arbitration problem from Table 3, the respective
claims are: d1=30, d2 = 40, d3 = 60, d4=120, corresponding to a quarter, a third,
a half, and all of the estate E = 120, respectively. Introducing these values in the
general solution (11), (12), we get:
ω1 = 712 , ω2 = 10
5
6




which is the Talmudic solution.
3 Iterative, step-by-step solutions of the ancient problems
In Sect. 2, the three ancient problems have been solved in one step, viewed as three-
person, two-person, and four-person games, respectively. There is an alternative way
of solving them, in an iterative way, following a step-by-step approach.
3.1 The iterative solution of the bankruptcy problem
Aumann and Maschler (1985) proposed an iterative, step-by-step solution of the bank-
ruptcy problem, as explained in Sect.1. It is based on two assumptions, taken as
postulates:
Assumption 1 If no claim is smaller than the current available estate E˜ , each creditor
gets E˜/n.
Assumption 2 If i is the first creditor whose claim di is smaller than the remain-
ing estate available Ei−1, where E0 is the initial estate E , he is awarded di/2; the
remaining creditors get Ei = Ei−1 − di/2.
Except these explicit assumptions, the Aumann–Maschler solution implicitly
assumes that the judge gives the awards sequentially, starting with the creditor which
has the lowest claim. We notice also that Assumption 2 mentioned above is equivalent
to the application of the contested garment solution at each step, as long as there is a
claim smaller than the current remaining estate.
The Shapley value method implies the Aumann–Maschler solution. Indeed, as
proved in Sect. 2.4, the Shapley value gives the contested garment solution. This fact
has been also noticed by (Moulin 2003, p. 57). Therefore, at each step, the creditor
with the smallest claim smaller than the current remaining estate available, competes
against all the other creditors, taken together, in a two-person game. The Shapley
value assigned to him is indeed half of his claim. On the other hand, as shown in
the remark from the beginning of Sect. 2.2, the Shapley value justifies Assumption 1,
postulated by Aumann–Maschler, showing that if there is no claim smaller than the
current available estate, the remaining creditors have to share it equally.
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3.2 The iterative solution of the rights arbitration problem
Let us assume that we have a four-player game where the players are N = {1, 2, 3, 4},
and the claims are such that d1 < d2 < d3 < E = d4. The entire estate may be split
in four disjoint parts: (0, E] = (0, d1] ∪ (d1, d2] ∪ (d2, d3] ∪ (d3, d4].
Assuming that all players are willing to share the portion of the estate to which they
are entitled, we have four steps:
Step 1 For the first portion, E1 = d1 −0 = d1 and E1 = d1 < d2 < d3 < d4. Accord-
ing to the remark proved in the beginning in Sect. 2.2, the Shapley value implies the fol-
lowing solution of the corresponding subgame: ω1,1 = ω2,1 = ω3,1 = ω4,1 = d1/4.
Step 2 For the second portion, we have E2 = d2 − d1 and E2 = d2 < d3 < d4. As
shown in the remark from the beginning of Sect. 2.2, the Shapley value implies the
following solution of the corresponding subgame: ω2,2 = ω3,2 = ω4,2 = (d2 −d1)/3.
Step 3 For the third portion, E3 = d3 −d2 and E3 = d3 < d4. As shown in the remark
from the beginning of Sect. 2.2, the Shapley value implies the following solution of
the corresponding subgame: ω3,3 = ω4,3 = (d3 − d2)/2.
Step 4 For the fourth portion, E4 = d4 − d3 and E4 = d4. As shown in the remark
from the beginning of Sect. 2.2, the Shapley value implies the following solution of
the corresponding subgame: ω4,4 = (d4 − d3)/1.
Taking all four steps into account, the iterative solution of the rights arbitration
problem is:
ω1 = ω1,1 = d1/4, ω2 = ω2,1 + ω2,2 = d1/4 + (d2 − d1)/3, (13)
ω3 = ω3,1 + ω3,2 + ω3,3 = d1/4 + (d2 − d1)/3 + (d3 − d2)/2, (14)
ω4 = ω4,1 + ω4,2 + ω4,3 + ω4,4
= d1/4 + (d2 − d1)/3 + (d3 − d2)/2 + (d4 − d3)/1, (15)
which is just the solution (11), (12), given in Sect. 2.
Going back to the ancient rights arbitration problem from Table 3, the respective
claims are: d1 = 30, d2 = 40, d3 = 60, d4 = 120, corresponding to a quarter, a
third, a half, and all of the estate E=120, respectively. Introducing these values in the
general solution (13)–(15), we get:
ω1 = 712 , ω2 = 10
5
6




which is the Talmudic solution.
Remark For the rights arbitration problem with d1 = 30, d2 = 40, d3 = 60, d4 = 120,
E = 120, the Aumann–Maschler solution (ω1 = 15, ω2 = 20, ω3 = 30, ω4 = 55) is
different from the Talmudic solution.
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4 Conclusion
Today, all the cases mentioned in the three ancient problems would be probably solved
using the division of the estate proportionally with the respective claims and perhaps
very few people would object to such a solution. But the main purpose of this paper,
and of so many other papers about this topic, is to find a rationale for the ancient
solutions. The objective of this paper is to show that the game theory logic based on
the Shapley value may be consistently applied for solving, in a uniform way, all three
ancient problems, namely the three wives problem, the contested garment problem,
and the rights arbitration problem. The main conclusion is that using the concept of
Shapley value from the n-person game theory, all the numerical solutions to these
ancient problems, as mentioned in Tables 1–3, may be obtained in a straightforward
way. Before using this tool, however, it is essential to identify what kind of games
are involved in each of these problems. The decision making is based on the same
tool, namely the game theory logic based on the Shapley value, but the specific games
involved are slightly different. The kind of claims of the players and the relationship
between the given claims and the given resources available, on one hand, and the
specific way of evaluating the value of each possible coalition, on the other hand,
determine the particular type of game which has to be solved in each of the three
ancient problems mentioned.
In order to apply the Shapley value of the players, the generalized characteristic
function of each game has to be defined. The essential point is that the value of this
generalized characteristic function assigned to a player has to reflect the maximum
claim this player can make, subject to the restrictions induced by the relationship
between all the claims and the given estate. Each player with a claim smaller than
the estate may ask for that claim but, as discussed in Sect. 2.2, if no claim is smaller
than the current portion of the estate still available, the respective players have to share
equally this surplus. As a consequence, when the generalized characteristic function of
the corresponding game is defined, we have to make a distinction between the players
whose claims are smaller than the estate and those whose claims are not smaller than
the estate.
The value of each proper potential coalition, however, is not uniquely determined
by the given claims and estate. It may be calculated either by summing up the claims
of the members of the respective coalition or by taking the maximum of these claims,
to the extent to which they do not exceed the estate. The decision based on the first
kind of computation induces a cumulative game. The decision based on the second
kind of computation induces a maximal game. In a cumulative game the players do
not cooperate and are not willing to share or reach a compromise when they join a
coalition. In a maximal game the players are supposed to be willing to compromise,
and share parts of their claims when they join a coalition. The ancient division of
the estate shown in Tables 1–3 may be obtained by using the Shapley value, as the
unique mathematical tool, if the game corresponding for the three wives problem is
cumulative and the game corresponding to the rights arbitration problem is maxi-
mal. Finally, the contested garment problem is very simple and contains no proper
coalitions; it may be solved, as a simple two-person game, in one straightforward
step.
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Section 2 contains the general, one-step solutions of the three ancient problems,
viewed as n-person games. Section 3 contains the iterative, step-by-step solution
of the bankruptcy problem and the right arbitration problem. It is shown that the
Shapley value method implies the well-known Aumann–Maschler iterative solution
of the bankruptcy problem.
Examining today the old solutions given to the three ancient problems, the numbers
from Table 1 look like they were obtained by Rabbi Nathan using the Shapley value,
knowing that the three wives hated each other, whereas the numbers from Table 3
look like they were obtained by Abraham Ibn Ezra using the same Shapley value but
assuming that the four brothers were willing to compromise and share parts of their
claims!
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